Lecture for YCMES: “Yemen Human Development: Challenges & Opportunities”
Marta Colburn December 14th, 2009
I. Development Actors
Civil Society – local & international
Bi-Lateral Entities – Saudi, Kuwait
Multi-Lateral Entities – UN system, EU, World Bank, Arab Donors, AGFUND
Although, Yemen’s ranking is very low in the UN Human Development Index for 2008 (138 out of 179 countries), development assistance or ODA remains low. According to Yemeni government officials, the country receives on average $13 to $15 per capita in total foreign aid money—less per capita than many sub-Saharan Africa countries receive.
Saudi Arabia is the largest donor, with Arab donors investing more in infrastructure and Western donors more in software.
Summary of the history of donor assistance to Yemen:
Most significant watershed point was the dramatic drop following the August of 1990 (a little over two months after Yemeni unification) when Iraq invaded Kuwait. As the only Arab country on the UN Security Council in 1990-91, Yemen’s position of neutrality and advocacy of a non-military Arab diplomatic solution was seen as de facto support for Saddam Hussein by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, many other Arab countries and the United States. As a result, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf states cut off their substantial financial assistance to Yemen, including a US$300 million aid package from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait alone. The US government reduced its assistance program from US$42 million a year to US$3million.
In fiscal 2009, total US aid for Yemen was $27.5 million, of which $21 million is development assistance. The remainder includes Foreign Military Financing, counter terrorism and related programs, and International Military and Education Training.
The Obama administration has requested that US aid to Yemen more than double for fiscal 2010 to more than $50 million, excluding military and security funding. U.S. military and security funding for fiscal 2010 will jump to more than $66 million for counter terrorism, anti-piracy, and border security assistance—more than double the amount for the two previous years combined.
It must be noted that the most significant contributor to development in Yemen has actually been citizens. Through remittances Yemenis built homes, bought and improved agriculture, but also contributed to community level investments such as schools and roads. In the 1970s and 80s when expatriate Yemen labor in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf was at its peak, such unskilled laborers (almost half were illiterate and only 18% had any formal education) sent remittances totalling nearly US$2 billion annually, dropping to $300 million in the early 1990s. With the 1990 expulsion of nearly a million Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf this lifeline to rural communities ended.
II. Demographics
1. Rural Profile
73% of Yemenis reside in rural villages or clusters of homes - living in such mountainous terrain makes the provision of infrastructure and services a challenge (roads, health care, education, water and electricity).
Urban poverty has declined from 32% (1998) to 20.7% (2005), but more than 40% of rural residents are now poor.
According to UNDP (2008) 15.7% of Yemenis lived on less than $1 a day and 45.2% lived on less than $2 a day (the official poverty line).
While rural Yemenis have always faced isolation and poverty, the long tradition of male migration for work outside of the country has been limited in the last 15 years.
2. Youth bulge
Yemen is a country of youth with nearly 50% of the population under the age of 15 and 76% of the population under age 28.
Youth unemployment rate is double that of adults (18.7% as compared to 8.4% in 1999, and estimated at between 31.2% and 37.4% in 2008 ).
190,000 young people enter the labor market each year with little or no marketable skills, which is closely tied to poor education outcomes including no linkage to labor demand needs.
75% of the unemployed were first time job seekers.
In recent years traditional labor outlets in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf have shrunk significantly.
This demographic reality contributes to instability in Yemen from two sides of the equation, on the one hand the vulnerability of young people due to frustration and lack of economic, social and political opportunities and on the other hand their engagement in crime, violence, conflict and the active recruitment of young men to extremist causes.
3. Population explosion
The population of Yemen has doubled in size since 1990 and is projected to almost double again by 2025 (from 19.7m in 2004 to 38m in 2025).
Yemen has a 3.5% population growth rate (2006), one of the highest in the world.
Fertility rates have decreased dramatically since 1990 (when Yemeni women delivered 8.3 live births per lifetime) to the current estimated 6.5 births per woman. Although, according to the Ministry of Health (2007) at any given moment, nearly 16% of women in Yemen were pregnant.
III. Economic Issues
1. Poverty & Unemployment
Unemployment is conservatively estimated at present by the government at 16%
The country has high rates of poverty (35% of the population is below the poverty line).
Estimates vary, but between 2007-08 a 60% spike in food prices significantly impacted poor households throughout Yemen with an 120% increase in the cost of bulk flour.
Yemen has high rates of malnutrition (one in three Yemenis suffer from chronic hunger), illiteracy (45.7%), and infant, child and maternal mortality. According to UNICEF 370 women die per 100,000 live births; the under-five mortality rate was 73 per 1,000 live births; the infant mortality rate (under 12 months) was 55 per 1,000 live births; the neonatal mortality rate was 41 per 1,000 live births.
Yemen’s population explosion means that the country has to manage more efficiently and equitably its financial resources in order to meet the various Millennium Development Goals.
2. Looming economic crisis
Yemen's economy depends mainly on its declining oil resources which account for 30-35% of GDP, providing 75% of government revenues and 90% of export receipts.
World Bank predicts that state revenues from oil and gas sales will plummet sharply during 2009–10 and fall to zero by 2017. The lack of state budget will further exacerbate the economic challenges facing the country and contribute to poverty and instability.
In 2009, inflation should decline to under 10% from its 2008 level of 19%.
Diesel subsidies - Yemen, where despite sharp price increases, the government still subsidies prices of USD 0.28 per liter (USD 1.08 per gallon) for diesel. Very small gap between oil revenues ($4.2 million annually) and subsidies (approximately $3.7 million0).
In recognition of the severe budgetary shortfalls, at the beginning of 2009 the Finance Ministry reportedly ordered budget cuts of 50% throughout the entire bureaucracy. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, however, cuts of only 4% have been implemented.
The investment climate in Yemen remains weak. In its 2010 Doing Business survey, the World Bank ranked Yemen 99 out of 183 countries for which the overall ease of doing business was assessed, moderately improving its score from 2009 by 4 points. Yemen’s weakest scores were in getting credit (150 out of 183), although the country’s ranking rose from 2009 of 174th to 150th in 2010. Other key issues according to the report were paying taxes and dropping from 141st in 2009 to 148th in 2010 and protecting investors, also dropping from 127th to 132nd.
IV. Governance
1. Corruption
Rampant corruption in all sectors of government has created a hemorrhaging economy, an inhospitable investment environment, and a government that lacks credibility. Corruption is a significant factor contributing to extremism and weak rule of law.
Patronage network: four factors for distribution and thus major corruption:
1.) National budget
2.) Procurement system
3.) Military-commercial complex
4.) General People’s Congress (GPC) party machine
Cronyism in the government is another big problem. The system and salaries are designed to attract crooks, the salaries are pathetic compared to private sector salaries, but opportunities to steal are prolific. That is why our civil servants are unqualified and often corrupt. This rots the system from the inside out by creating a civil servant corps that has low productivity. It promotes corruption on small and large scales, and it creates a hostile investment environment.
Nepotism.
Give example of payments for government job – 500,000 YR in Mareb, 300,000 YR in Hajja and Al-Jawf.
2. Weak rule of law
Context of traditional weak state and tensions between the state and tribes.
Political unrest – South
Tribal conflict - approximate 6 to 17 million small arms for a population of 23 million means that it is one of the most heavily armed countries in the world. In an NDI report (2007) it was found that 44% of the sheiks said that young men are becoming more difficult to control compared to five years ago. Of those who answered yes, 60% said that young people are becoming less controllable because of lack of awareness about the consequences of conflict, 20% because of poverty and unemployment, 7% because of political party-related issues and 4% because of the conflict itself.
Al-Huthis - Al-Huthi insurgency has festered since 2004 with the sixth encounter flaring up in November 2009. This conflict has primarily focused in Sa’adah governorate claiming thousands of lives and displacing an estimated 190,000 Yemenis over the last five years (UNHCR estimates November 2009).
There is a lack of infrastructure, services and security in much of rural Yemen.
3. Terrorism
Litany is long and I am sure you and your families are more familiar with it than you would care to be. Contextual factors that contribute include poverty, unemployment, corruption and a lack of positive activities for young people such as sports and youth clubs, particularly in rural areas where over 70% of the population resides.
The general context of radicalism, extremism and terrorism in Yemen includes a wide range of factors including:
1. Presence of returned mujahideen that have come home and gained varying levels of acceptance in broader Yemeni society
2. Recent increasing presence of Al-Qaeda particularly with the early 2009 announcement of the merger between the group’s Saudi Arabian and Yemeni forces. There is considerable evidence of the recruitment efforts of violent extremists in Yemen, particularly among young men, is of grave concern. The young Yemen suicide bomber involved in the March 2009 attack in the Hadramaut was recruited by such individuals indicating active recruitment for such terrorist activities.
3. Ongoing US military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the broadly perceived US support of Israel, also contribute to high levels of frustration with the global status quo.
4. Perceived anti-Islamic policies and attitudes in the West and the US fuel resentment and contribute to the appeal of violent extremism in Yemen. In January 2009, hundreds of thousands demonstrated in various Yemen cities in support of Palestinians in Gaza. Preachers in mosques across the country and a Fatwa issued by the Yemeni Scholars Association calling on Arab leaders to enable their people and armies to help people in Gaza defeat the Zionist enemy indicate the volatility of the situation and trigger events that can contribute to strengthening the appeal of radical perspectives.
5. Weak rule of law exists in many parts of the country and an erosion of national identity, particularly at the present time with the troubles in the North and South.
6. The continued incarceration of the Yemenis in Guantanamo Bay (nearly 100 Yemenis remain in detention, the largest national group of the remaining 239 as of June 2009) is an issue of concern.
Yemeni government efforts to eradicate terrorism and maintain security have left much to be desired. Unfortunately, many efforts in Yemen, and internationally, to address terrorism see the phenomenon through a security lens, which often sidelines the human dimension and enabling factors that are root causes.
V. Water Crisis
Historically Yemen has periodically suffered from drought and recent global weather patterns affected by climate change have exacerbated the country’s water crisis. Additionally, Yemen’s population is increasing rapidly, straining already stressed water sources.
Yemen’s per capita water consumption at 125 m3 annually is one of the lowest in the world.
Only 19.1% of citizens have access to adequate sanitation facilities, 31.5% to safe drinking water (the percentage of the rural population that has access to water from improved sources is actually declining from 68% of the population in 1990 to 65% in 2004 ).
While rainfall may vary from year to year, in recent years, the water table in Yemen has annually fallen an estimated 2 meters (or 6.6 feet), forcing wells to be dug deeper).
Total amount of water used annually is 3.5 billion m3, of which 93% is used in agriculture (approximately a third of which irrigates fields of qat - estimated 75% of Yemeni men), 6% in households and 1% by industry.
Gap between used water and renewed fresh water about 1 billion m3 a year. Additional the problem of a predicted doubling in the population by 2025 means that far higher amounts of water will be required to sustain the country (4.6 billion m3).
Lack of political will for a rational water policy is highly unlikely to improve.
16% of deaths in Yemeni children under the age of five are caused by diarrheal diseases. Additionally, diarrhea is the number two cause of death of Yemenis of all ages, causing 11% of deaths.
A study which is currently being compiled has found that of the 29,000 conflicts over the past 20 years 85% have involved water resources.
Land for agriculture only includes 13.6% of land, however only 1.2-1.6 million hectares is actually under cultivation. A recent report by the MAI noted that 85% of the agricultural lands are subject to deterioration from a variety of causes (including traditional pasturage methods have also contributed to soil erosion and deterioration). While a significant proportion of agriculture in Yemen is still rain fed, much of it is subsistence farming and largely the responsibility of women.
VI. Gender Equity
18% of girls aged 15-19 years and 60% of girls aged 20-24 years are married as opposed to 4% and 31% of boys in same age-groups, 14% had been married before 15. About 1.6 million girls are married before age 20, and 900,000 teenage mothers give birth every year. One third of maternal deaths can be directly linked to early marriage.
Female adult (over the age of 15) illiteracy rates are an astounding 68.6% (2004 census) and seven out of 21 governorates (1/3) are have over 80% female illiteracy rates (Sa’adah 86.8%, Raymah 86.3%, Hajja 85.4%, Dhamar 82.6%, Amran 81.9%, Al-Mahweet 81.4% and Al-Jawf 80.3%).
While the gender gap in education enrollment rates has decreased in recent years, it still remains high. Girls make up only one-third of primary school enrollments and only one in four girls go on to attend secondary school. Female secondary enrollment rates show dramatic disparity between governorates, ranging between 57% in Sana'a City to 2.6% in Shebwa Governorate.
There are three time consuming and often physically challenging tasks in rural Yemen that older female children (usually 10 and above) and women are responsible for – fetching water and gathering firewood and fodder for animals. The time spent on these female designated tasks varies considerably between diverse geographical areas and depending on the availability of such resources, as well as the affluence of families. All three tasks have a deep impact on girls’ enrollment in school, particularly for girls over 10 years of age and all three should be examined when building schools.
V. Conclusion
Dire situation, but there is room for hope
Youth programming including RAWFD
SFD efforts as a Yemeni-operated and directed institution
- Serving as a “university” for development professionals
Private sector initiatives such as Silver Filters
Human resources improvement from 1980s
Decentralization
Positive tribal traditions
- Conflict management, charity and generosity. Yemeni tribes have time-honored traditions in conflict prevention and resolution including using arbitration and mediation techniques, as well as highly-sophisticated systems of compensation when violence does erupt. Such traditions recognize the destructive nature of conflict and seek to prevent its outbreak and when it erupts to mitigate its damage. One astute informant during the assessment noted that the tribal model is designed to control the most contentious aspects of daily life to mitigate conflict. In other words, tribes behave in warlike ways and sometimes resort to war in order to make peace. Most tribal conflicts result in very little loss of life.
Yemen is blessed with indigenous democratic and entrepreneurial traditions that despite challenges continue to thrive.
Marta Colburn December 14th, 2009
I. Development Actors
Civil Society – local & international
Bi-Lateral Entities – Saudi, Kuwait
Multi-Lateral Entities – UN system, EU, World Bank, Arab Donors, AGFUND
Although, Yemen’s ranking is very low in the UN Human Development Index for 2008 (138 out of 179 countries), development assistance or ODA remains low. According to Yemeni government officials, the country receives on average $13 to $15 per capita in total foreign aid money—less per capita than many sub-Saharan Africa countries receive.
Saudi Arabia is the largest donor, with Arab donors investing more in infrastructure and Western donors more in software.
Summary of the history of donor assistance to Yemen:
Most significant watershed point was the dramatic drop following the August of 1990 (a little over two months after Yemeni unification) when Iraq invaded Kuwait. As the only Arab country on the UN Security Council in 1990-91, Yemen’s position of neutrality and advocacy of a non-military Arab diplomatic solution was seen as de facto support for Saddam Hussein by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, many other Arab countries and the United States. As a result, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf states cut off their substantial financial assistance to Yemen, including a US$300 million aid package from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait alone. The US government reduced its assistance program from US$42 million a year to US$3million.
In fiscal 2009, total US aid for Yemen was $27.5 million, of which $21 million is development assistance. The remainder includes Foreign Military Financing, counter terrorism and related programs, and International Military and Education Training.
The Obama administration has requested that US aid to Yemen more than double for fiscal 2010 to more than $50 million, excluding military and security funding. U.S. military and security funding for fiscal 2010 will jump to more than $66 million for counter terrorism, anti-piracy, and border security assistance—more than double the amount for the two previous years combined.
It must be noted that the most significant contributor to development in Yemen has actually been citizens. Through remittances Yemenis built homes, bought and improved agriculture, but also contributed to community level investments such as schools and roads. In the 1970s and 80s when expatriate Yemen labor in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf was at its peak, such unskilled laborers (almost half were illiterate and only 18% had any formal education) sent remittances totalling nearly US$2 billion annually, dropping to $300 million in the early 1990s. With the 1990 expulsion of nearly a million Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf this lifeline to rural communities ended.
II. Demographics
1. Rural Profile
73% of Yemenis reside in rural villages or clusters of homes - living in such mountainous terrain makes the provision of infrastructure and services a challenge (roads, health care, education, water and electricity).
Urban poverty has declined from 32% (1998) to 20.7% (2005), but more than 40% of rural residents are now poor.
According to UNDP (2008) 15.7% of Yemenis lived on less than $1 a day and 45.2% lived on less than $2 a day (the official poverty line).
While rural Yemenis have always faced isolation and poverty, the long tradition of male migration for work outside of the country has been limited in the last 15 years.
2. Youth bulge
Yemen is a country of youth with nearly 50% of the population under the age of 15 and 76% of the population under age 28.
Youth unemployment rate is double that of adults (18.7% as compared to 8.4% in 1999, and estimated at between 31.2% and 37.4% in 2008 ).
190,000 young people enter the labor market each year with little or no marketable skills, which is closely tied to poor education outcomes including no linkage to labor demand needs.
75% of the unemployed were first time job seekers.
In recent years traditional labor outlets in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf have shrunk significantly.
This demographic reality contributes to instability in Yemen from two sides of the equation, on the one hand the vulnerability of young people due to frustration and lack of economic, social and political opportunities and on the other hand their engagement in crime, violence, conflict and the active recruitment of young men to extremist causes.
3. Population explosion
The population of Yemen has doubled in size since 1990 and is projected to almost double again by 2025 (from 19.7m in 2004 to 38m in 2025).
Yemen has a 3.5% population growth rate (2006), one of the highest in the world.
Fertility rates have decreased dramatically since 1990 (when Yemeni women delivered 8.3 live births per lifetime) to the current estimated 6.5 births per woman. Although, according to the Ministry of Health (2007) at any given moment, nearly 16% of women in Yemen were pregnant.
III. Economic Issues
1. Poverty & Unemployment
Unemployment is conservatively estimated at present by the government at 16%
The country has high rates of poverty (35% of the population is below the poverty line).
Estimates vary, but between 2007-08 a 60% spike in food prices significantly impacted poor households throughout Yemen with an 120% increase in the cost of bulk flour.
Yemen has high rates of malnutrition (one in three Yemenis suffer from chronic hunger), illiteracy (45.7%), and infant, child and maternal mortality. According to UNICEF 370 women die per 100,000 live births; the under-five mortality rate was 73 per 1,000 live births; the infant mortality rate (under 12 months) was 55 per 1,000 live births; the neonatal mortality rate was 41 per 1,000 live births.
Yemen’s population explosion means that the country has to manage more efficiently and equitably its financial resources in order to meet the various Millennium Development Goals.
2. Looming economic crisis
Yemen's economy depends mainly on its declining oil resources which account for 30-35% of GDP, providing 75% of government revenues and 90% of export receipts.
World Bank predicts that state revenues from oil and gas sales will plummet sharply during 2009–10 and fall to zero by 2017. The lack of state budget will further exacerbate the economic challenges facing the country and contribute to poverty and instability.
In 2009, inflation should decline to under 10% from its 2008 level of 19%.
Diesel subsidies - Yemen, where despite sharp price increases, the government still subsidies prices of USD 0.28 per liter (USD 1.08 per gallon) for diesel. Very small gap between oil revenues ($4.2 million annually) and subsidies (approximately $3.7 million0).
In recognition of the severe budgetary shortfalls, at the beginning of 2009 the Finance Ministry reportedly ordered budget cuts of 50% throughout the entire bureaucracy. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, however, cuts of only 4% have been implemented.
The investment climate in Yemen remains weak. In its 2010 Doing Business survey, the World Bank ranked Yemen 99 out of 183 countries for which the overall ease of doing business was assessed, moderately improving its score from 2009 by 4 points. Yemen’s weakest scores were in getting credit (150 out of 183), although the country’s ranking rose from 2009 of 174th to 150th in 2010. Other key issues according to the report were paying taxes and dropping from 141st in 2009 to 148th in 2010 and protecting investors, also dropping from 127th to 132nd.
IV. Governance
1. Corruption
Rampant corruption in all sectors of government has created a hemorrhaging economy, an inhospitable investment environment, and a government that lacks credibility. Corruption is a significant factor contributing to extremism and weak rule of law.
Patronage network: four factors for distribution and thus major corruption:
1.) National budget
2.) Procurement system
3.) Military-commercial complex
4.) General People’s Congress (GPC) party machine
Cronyism in the government is another big problem. The system and salaries are designed to attract crooks, the salaries are pathetic compared to private sector salaries, but opportunities to steal are prolific. That is why our civil servants are unqualified and often corrupt. This rots the system from the inside out by creating a civil servant corps that has low productivity. It promotes corruption on small and large scales, and it creates a hostile investment environment.
Nepotism.
Give example of payments for government job – 500,000 YR in Mareb, 300,000 YR in Hajja and Al-Jawf.
2. Weak rule of law
Context of traditional weak state and tensions between the state and tribes.
Political unrest – South
Tribal conflict - approximate 6 to 17 million small arms for a population of 23 million means that it is one of the most heavily armed countries in the world. In an NDI report (2007) it was found that 44% of the sheiks said that young men are becoming more difficult to control compared to five years ago. Of those who answered yes, 60% said that young people are becoming less controllable because of lack of awareness about the consequences of conflict, 20% because of poverty and unemployment, 7% because of political party-related issues and 4% because of the conflict itself.
Al-Huthis - Al-Huthi insurgency has festered since 2004 with the sixth encounter flaring up in November 2009. This conflict has primarily focused in Sa’adah governorate claiming thousands of lives and displacing an estimated 190,000 Yemenis over the last five years (UNHCR estimates November 2009).
There is a lack of infrastructure, services and security in much of rural Yemen.
3. Terrorism
Litany is long and I am sure you and your families are more familiar with it than you would care to be. Contextual factors that contribute include poverty, unemployment, corruption and a lack of positive activities for young people such as sports and youth clubs, particularly in rural areas where over 70% of the population resides.
The general context of radicalism, extremism and terrorism in Yemen includes a wide range of factors including:
1. Presence of returned mujahideen that have come home and gained varying levels of acceptance in broader Yemeni society
2. Recent increasing presence of Al-Qaeda particularly with the early 2009 announcement of the merger between the group’s Saudi Arabian and Yemeni forces. There is considerable evidence of the recruitment efforts of violent extremists in Yemen, particularly among young men, is of grave concern. The young Yemen suicide bomber involved in the March 2009 attack in the Hadramaut was recruited by such individuals indicating active recruitment for such terrorist activities.
3. Ongoing US military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the broadly perceived US support of Israel, also contribute to high levels of frustration with the global status quo.
4. Perceived anti-Islamic policies and attitudes in the West and the US fuel resentment and contribute to the appeal of violent extremism in Yemen. In January 2009, hundreds of thousands demonstrated in various Yemen cities in support of Palestinians in Gaza. Preachers in mosques across the country and a Fatwa issued by the Yemeni Scholars Association calling on Arab leaders to enable their people and armies to help people in Gaza defeat the Zionist enemy indicate the volatility of the situation and trigger events that can contribute to strengthening the appeal of radical perspectives.
5. Weak rule of law exists in many parts of the country and an erosion of national identity, particularly at the present time with the troubles in the North and South.
6. The continued incarceration of the Yemenis in Guantanamo Bay (nearly 100 Yemenis remain in detention, the largest national group of the remaining 239 as of June 2009) is an issue of concern.
Yemeni government efforts to eradicate terrorism and maintain security have left much to be desired. Unfortunately, many efforts in Yemen, and internationally, to address terrorism see the phenomenon through a security lens, which often sidelines the human dimension and enabling factors that are root causes.
V. Water Crisis
Historically Yemen has periodically suffered from drought and recent global weather patterns affected by climate change have exacerbated the country’s water crisis. Additionally, Yemen’s population is increasing rapidly, straining already stressed water sources.
Yemen’s per capita water consumption at 125 m3 annually is one of the lowest in the world.
Only 19.1% of citizens have access to adequate sanitation facilities, 31.5% to safe drinking water (the percentage of the rural population that has access to water from improved sources is actually declining from 68% of the population in 1990 to 65% in 2004 ).
While rainfall may vary from year to year, in recent years, the water table in Yemen has annually fallen an estimated 2 meters (or 6.6 feet), forcing wells to be dug deeper).
Total amount of water used annually is 3.5 billion m3, of which 93% is used in agriculture (approximately a third of which irrigates fields of qat - estimated 75% of Yemeni men), 6% in households and 1% by industry.
Gap between used water and renewed fresh water about 1 billion m3 a year. Additional the problem of a predicted doubling in the population by 2025 means that far higher amounts of water will be required to sustain the country (4.6 billion m3).
Lack of political will for a rational water policy is highly unlikely to improve.
16% of deaths in Yemeni children under the age of five are caused by diarrheal diseases. Additionally, diarrhea is the number two cause of death of Yemenis of all ages, causing 11% of deaths.
A study which is currently being compiled has found that of the 29,000 conflicts over the past 20 years 85% have involved water resources.
Land for agriculture only includes 13.6% of land, however only 1.2-1.6 million hectares is actually under cultivation. A recent report by the MAI noted that 85% of the agricultural lands are subject to deterioration from a variety of causes (including traditional pasturage methods have also contributed to soil erosion and deterioration). While a significant proportion of agriculture in Yemen is still rain fed, much of it is subsistence farming and largely the responsibility of women.
VI. Gender Equity
18% of girls aged 15-19 years and 60% of girls aged 20-24 years are married as opposed to 4% and 31% of boys in same age-groups, 14% had been married before 15. About 1.6 million girls are married before age 20, and 900,000 teenage mothers give birth every year. One third of maternal deaths can be directly linked to early marriage.
Female adult (over the age of 15) illiteracy rates are an astounding 68.6% (2004 census) and seven out of 21 governorates (1/3) are have over 80% female illiteracy rates (Sa’adah 86.8%, Raymah 86.3%, Hajja 85.4%, Dhamar 82.6%, Amran 81.9%, Al-Mahweet 81.4% and Al-Jawf 80.3%).
While the gender gap in education enrollment rates has decreased in recent years, it still remains high. Girls make up only one-third of primary school enrollments and only one in four girls go on to attend secondary school. Female secondary enrollment rates show dramatic disparity between governorates, ranging between 57% in Sana'a City to 2.6% in Shebwa Governorate.
There are three time consuming and often physically challenging tasks in rural Yemen that older female children (usually 10 and above) and women are responsible for – fetching water and gathering firewood and fodder for animals. The time spent on these female designated tasks varies considerably between diverse geographical areas and depending on the availability of such resources, as well as the affluence of families. All three tasks have a deep impact on girls’ enrollment in school, particularly for girls over 10 years of age and all three should be examined when building schools.
V. Conclusion
Dire situation, but there is room for hope
Youth programming including RAWFD
SFD efforts as a Yemeni-operated and directed institution
- Serving as a “university” for development professionals
Private sector initiatives such as Silver Filters
Human resources improvement from 1980s
Decentralization
Positive tribal traditions
- Conflict management, charity and generosity. Yemeni tribes have time-honored traditions in conflict prevention and resolution including using arbitration and mediation techniques, as well as highly-sophisticated systems of compensation when violence does erupt. Such traditions recognize the destructive nature of conflict and seek to prevent its outbreak and when it erupts to mitigate its damage. One astute informant during the assessment noted that the tribal model is designed to control the most contentious aspects of daily life to mitigate conflict. In other words, tribes behave in warlike ways and sometimes resort to war in order to make peace. Most tribal conflicts result in very little loss of life.
Yemen is blessed with indigenous democratic and entrepreneurial traditions that despite challenges continue to thrive.
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